the institutional environment of regulatory policy-making. They have sought, in short, to change administrative law.
Recent regulatory reform proposals reveal how much administrative law is centrally concerned with promoting more legitimate and effective governance. 8 Administrative law is constructed and re-constructed on the basis of assumptions about how particular procedural arrangements will affect the behavior and performance of government officials and organizations. As a result, the insights and methods of other disciplines, such as political science, economics, and organizational behavior have contributed greatly to the development of administrative law scholarship. 9 Indeed, interest in inter-disciplinary work in administrative law appears to be growing. For example, much political economy analysis has focused on how legislatures and executives try to use administrative procedures to exercise control the policy decisions of unelected bureaucrats. 10 Other recent research has analyzed judges' voting records in administrative law cases to test the extent to which judicial decision making correlates with political ideology.
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Empirical research can contribute to a clearer understanding of the role that administrative law can play in democratic governance. It can also give us a better idea of how reforms to regulatory institutions and processes can improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy of regulatory governance. Just as substantive changes to regulatory policy should be judged by their impact on society, so too should changes to the regulatory process be assessed by their outcomes. 12 Given the steady interest in reforming the regulatory process, empirical analysis can profitably extend itself further and in new directions. Scholars and policy makers have much more to learn from the careful and systematic empirical study of administrative law.
In this article, I argue for increased use of empirical analysis to evaluate how well institutional procedures and designs achieve public goals. Social science research strategies provide an important basis for evaluating the effects of various kinds of procedures on administrative rulemaking. After introducing some basic concepts and issues in empirical research on administrative law, I proceed in the remaining parts to illustrate the value of empirical analysis by focusing on three salient aspects of regulatory See PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1994) (noting that much of administrative law scholarship "is a product of disciplines other than law relying on methodologies other than case analysis [and] embraces the positive and the normative, the empirical and theoretical, the doctrinal and behavioral"). 10 For examples of the growing public choice literature on administrative procedure, see infra notes 16-18. procedure: economic analysis of new agency rules; judicial review of agency rules; and negotiated rulemaking. In these and other areas, empirical analysis provides decision makers and scholars with the means for making more informed choices about how to design effective and legitimate governing institutions.
I. Administrative Law and Empirical Inquiry
Administrative law seeks to guide the use of government authority in ways that promote values such as democracy, fairness, effectiveness, and efficiency. Legal scholars have long recognized the discretion held by agency officials who are not directly accountable to the public, viewing this discretion both as a reality of legislative delegation as well as a problem to be solved. 13 The aim in much of the literature has been to identify procedures that encourage administrators to exercise their discretion in socially desirable ways. For example, by making administrative decision making transparent through requirements for public comment and open meetings, administrative procedures provide citizens and organized interests an ability to represent their views in the administrative process.
14 Open procedures are thought to foster pluralist politics that protect against regulatory capture, the danger that an industry will come to control an agency's decision making to secure private benefits.
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More recently, researchers have come to study administrative procedures as efforts by legislators to try to hardwire agency policymaking. 16 From the standpoint of the legislator, administrative discretion creates the potential for bureaucratic drift. This occurs when the agency makes choices other than what the enacting legislative coalition would have preferred. Legislators themselves are not able to monitor directly all of the activities of the regulatory agencies they create. 17 Consequently, administrative procedures provide a potential solution to the problem of bureaucratic drift as they may facilitate monitoring by interest groups or otherwise help entrench the policy preferences 13 For empirically-oriented treatments of agency discretion, see MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET Positive political economy has made an important contribution by revealing how administrative procedures can be policy instruments themselves. When legislators or executive branch officials impose procedural requirements on administrative agencies, they purportedly do so in order to achieve some instrumental goals, whether it be to improve the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of regulations, prevent capture, reduce conflict, or change the pace of the rulemaking process. These goals may not always be, or perhaps even are seldom likely to be, fully consistent with the broader public interest, but the reforms are nevertheless intended to have some consequences. A key question is whether different procedural arrangements actually achieve the goals that they are intended to achieve or that others might want them to serve.
Reform proposals are based, either explicitly or implicitly, on a set of claims about how some outcome in the world would be different (usually for the better) if the reforms were adopted. Through empirical analysis, the researcher is able to assess the impact of these reforms, or any other policy intervention, on those intended outcomes. Such analysis provides a basis for understanding how changes in the behavior and outcomes of regulatory agencies arise due to changes in the standards and procedures that govern these agencies. In short, empirical analysis shows whether administrative law makes a difference.
From the standpoint of those interested in institutional design and regulatory policy, empirical analysis is essential for determining how institutions and procedures affect regulatory decision making. For example, in deciding whether to impose or keep in place requirements that agencies conduct cost-benefit analysis before issuing new rules, the key question is whether regulatory decisions improve with respect to intended and measurable criteria when these requirements are imposed. Do the requirements lead to regulatory decisions that are themselves more efficient? This necessitates empirical analysis to determine the costs and benefits of regulatory decisions made in the absence of these requirements, and to compare them with the costs and benefits of regulations made under conditions where economic analysis requirements are imposed. Also, it will be relevant to investigate whether such requirements lead to other changes in regulatory decisions. For instance, do they delay the imposition of new regulations that might otherwise be net beneficial? To decide whether the benefits of additional economic analysis outweigh the costs of conducting the analysis, it is necessary to evaluate the impact analytical requirements have in terms of relevant outcomes of interest, such as efficiency or rulemaking time.
The purpose of empirical analysis, at its core, is to explain variation and support causal inferences. Empirical analysts of administrative law seek to determine whether measured outcomes vary depending on whether one or another procedure is used. The aim is to identify how much of what is observed can be attributed to a particular procedure as opposed to other factors that might affect the outcomes of concern. This is 18 See, e.g., DAVID There are three basic ways to conduct empirical research. 21 The first of these, a controlled experiment, is the ideal model for empirical research. In a controlled experiment, researchers control conditions in a laboratory environment, varying one factor at a time so that any change in outcome can be attributed to the factor that was varied. If all the other potential contributing factors to the outcome are held constant, the counterfactual can be estimated quite clearly. It is evidenced by the outcome prior to the change made in the factor manipulated by the researcher. With this approach, researchers can have an extremely high degree of confidence that any resulting changes were due to the treatment manipulated by the researcher. Of course, empirical analysis of administrative law cannot proceed via the kind of laboratory experiments that are used in the physical sciences, but the controlled experiment does provides an important model for other research strategies.
The second way empirical research can be structured is to use a randomized experiment, which is the next best strategy to a controlled experiment. A randomized experiment requires that the outcomes in a group of treated entities (the treatment group) be compared with the outcomes in a group of untreated entities (the control group). The control group provides the basis upon which the researcher can infer the counterfactual. Of course, it is always possible that factors other than the treatment could explain any observed differences in outcome between two groups. This potential for confounding factors is addressed by randomly assigning the treatment so that, on average, changes in any confounding factors will cancel each other out across both the control and treatment groups, leaving any observed difference in outcomes attributable with confidence to the treatment. By definition, the randomized experiment requires random assignment of the treatment, and this may seldom be feasible in the realm of administrative law or other settings where norms of equal treatment prevail.
The third way to design empirical research is through an observational study, which is available whenever laboratory controls or randomized treatment are not feasible. There are two basic types of observational studies: longitudinal and cross-sectional. A longitudinal design compares outcomes over time. The outcomes before the adoption of a reform are compared with outcomes after its adoption. A cross-sectional design compares outcomes in the same time period between one group operating under the procedure and one that does not. In other words, the researcher can compare the outcomes in jurisdictions or individual cases that operate under one set of procedures with jurisdictions or cases operating under another procedure. If all things other than the existence of the procedure are equal, then the researcher can make a strong inference that observable differences in the outcomes between the two groups over time or across domains resulted from the procedure. This is referred to as the procedure's impact.
Of course, other things are not always equal in an observational study because the treatment and comparison groups have not been randomly selected. As a result, the researcher needs to take into account factors other than the procedure that might be affecting the outcome. 22 Sometimes, for example, procedural changes occur in conjunction with other changes, making it more difficult to untangle the precise effect of the procedure versus other factors. For example, consider how a researcher might assess the impact of President Reagan's 1981 executive order requiring agencies to conduct economic analysis for all major rules. If a researcher simply compared regulations prior to 1981 with those issued later, it may be difficult to determine how much of any observed difference is due to the executive order versus how much is due to the fact that at about the same time new, Reagan political appointees (possessing different policy ideologies than their predecessors) took charge of the various federal regulatory agencies. A way around this potential problem might be to shift from a longitudinal design to a cross-sectional one, comparing regulatory decisions at the state level. Researchers might compare similar kinds of regulatory decisions between states with economic analysis requirements and states without such requirements, all the while controlling for other factors that might affect the outcome such as the party control of the state's legislature or governor's office.
A related problem can arise when agencies can voluntarily choose to adopt a procedure. For example, imagine that agencies were not required to conduct economic analysis but could voluntarily choose to do so. Researchers comparing outcomes in those rulemakings where the agency chose to conduct an analysis with those where it did not would confront a significant possibility of selection bias. 23 The rules voluntarily selected for economic analysis may well not be a representative subset of all agency rules. One might speculate that agencies would be more likely to employ benefit-cost analysis voluntarily for those rules that the agency believes have positive net benefits. Alternatively agencies might voluntarily use economic analysis for those rules which have the largest costs associated with them, which could mean that from the start these would be rules that are less likely to have positive net benefits. An empirical researcher would therefore need to consider whether selection bias might partly explain any differences found between the treatment and comparison groups.
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If the samples being compared are large and the assignments to the treatment group were made randomly, then researchers can have considerable confidence in 22 See King & Epstein, supra note 18, at 78 (discussing need to control statistically for rival or confounding variables). inferences about the procedure's impact, as other factors should be distributed about the same in both samples. 25 Large random samples, however desirable, are not necessary in order to draw reasonable inferences, and random assignment is often not available in empirical research on administrative law. 26 In the absence of random assignment and large samples, empirical researchers who undertake longitudinal or cross-sectional observational studies still must seek to control for other possible factors and assess the degree of confidence they can properly have in their inferences. Analysis can and does proceed even in the absence of large samples, but the researcher must select an appropriate research design and take care to consider possible threats to the validity of their inferences. 27 Only through such careful and systematic empirical research will scholars be able to learn how effective different procedural reforms turn out to be in improving government regulation.
II. Economic Review of New Regulations
Perhaps the most significant and persistent complaint about government regulation has been that it imposes excessive costs on the economy. For decades, reformers have argued for more cost-effective and efficient forms of regulation than currently exist. 28 It is widely accepted that the costs of different health, safety, and environmental regulations vary markedly, with some regulations costing only tens of thousands dollars for each life saved while others costing billions of dollars per life saved. 29 This variation in cost-effectiveness suggests that government could save more lives for an equivalent investment of social resources by re-allocating its priorities toward those regulatory efforts that are most cost-effective. 30 Reforms to improve the cost-effectiveness of federal regulation date back at least 25 KING ET AL., supra note 23, at 94 (discussing the value of random selection and large samples).
26
Id. at 94-95 (noting that inferences can be made even without large, random samples). 27 See MOHR, supra note 19, at 48-70 (discussing potential threats to "the validity of an inference or conclusion about a program impact based on a certain design"); Epstein & King, supra note 18, at 112-14 (discussing strategies for research based on small samples). to the Ford Administration. 31 In 1981, President Reagan issued an executive order requiring agencies to conduct economic analysis of proposed regulations and to have their analyses reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget, an approach that has been followed by each subsequent administration. 32 In the mid-1990s, Congress proposed legislation that would have required agencies not only to conduct economic analysis, but to have new regulations effectively pass a benefit-cost test. 33 While some of the more sweeping proposals introduced at the time were never adopted, Congress did pass the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 34 which essentially codified existing executivebranch requirements for agencies to perform economic analysis. 35 Agencies are now required by both executive order and statutory prescription to perform an assessment of the costs and benefits of any proposed regulation that would impose annual costs of more than $100 million on the economy. 36 These changes to the administrative process aim to increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of federal regulation by compelling agencies to assess benefits and costs, and to search for the lowest cost strategies. Executive Order 12,866 adopts the principle that agencies should "assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating," and "in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits."
37 By conducting the required economic analyses, agencies are confronted with the need to define problems, articulate alternative solutions, and consider which solution will best solve the problem with the least amount of resources.
The way that economic analysis is supposed to lead to improved efficiency can be specified in three basic steps. First, by conducting economic analysis, an agency is supposed to arrive at reasonably accurate estimates of the benefits and costs of different policy options. Second, the agency is supposed to make decisions that are consistent with the results of this economic analysis, that is by choosing the options that impose the lowest costs for a given level of benefits or that achieve the greatest net benefits. Finally, the decisions that agencies make on the basis of economic analysis should be different from (that is, more efficient than) the ones that they would otherwise make in the absence of the analysis. If in the absence of the economic analysis requirement an agency would have anyway adopted the least cost or greatest net benefit approach, then the requirement See, e.g., "Regulatory Reform Act of 1995," S. 291, 104 th Congress, 1st Session (1995) (proposing to require agencies, prior to issuing a new rule, to make "a reasonable determination … that the benefits of the rule justify the costs of the rule, and that the rule will substantially achieve the rulemaking objectives in a more cost-effective manner"). would be superfluous. In short, economic analysis requirements need to have an independent effect on what an agency does, making its decisions more efficient than they otherwise would be.
How well has the process of requiring economic analysis improved the efficiency of regulatory outcomes? Even though intuitively it may seem that such a requirement would make a difference, the question is ultimately an empirical one. Rather than simply assuming that an economic analysis requirement will lead to more cost-effective or efficient decisions, empirical analysis can be used to determine whether and how the procedural requirement for economic analysis changes regulatory outcomes.
A growing body of empirical research has recently emerged that examines the impacts of economic analysis requirements. With respect to the accuracy of economic analysis, several studies have raised questions about the quality of economic analyses that agencies have performed in response to the requirements of the executive orders. For one thing, many agencies apparently do not manage to collect the kind of information that is required of them and that would be necessary to determine the net benefits of different regulatory alternatives.
Robert Hahn and a team of researchers have examined the economic analyses agencies produced in nearly fifty major health, safety, and environmental rulemaking proceedings, assessing the extent to which the analyses met the requirements stated in the Executive Order as well as in guidelines issued by OMB. 38 Although agencies are directed to compare different regulatory options and wherever possible to choose the one that maximizes net benefits, Hahn and his team found that in only about a quarter of the rules they examined did agencies even quantify the costs and benefits of different regulatory options. 39 For a substantial percentage of the rules they examined, the agencies did not monetize all the costs and benefits they quantified. 40 Hahn's team also found that agencies sometimes used inconsistent discount rates in converting future costs and benefits into present value terms.
41 They concluded that "most economic analyses do not meet the expectations set forth in the Executive Order and the OMB guidelines, and a ignificant percentage clearly violate them." s When agencies do monetize costs and benefits before issuing a new regulation, the accuracy of these estimates is open to empirical scrutiny after the regulation has been implemented. Recent studies have attempted to assess how well the cost and benefit predictions made by regulatory agencies accurately reflect the costs and benefits that are incurred after a regulation is adopted. For example, James Hammitt compared the preadoption predictions of regulatory costs associated with reducing CFC consumption in the United States with post-adoption data. Hahn et al., supra note 38, at 876.
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Id. at 867-69 (reporting that only about 60% of the analyses monetized all the costs identified by agencies, while only about 30% monetized all the identified benefits).
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Id.
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Id. at 865. predictions substantially overestimated the control costs associated with the CFCphasedown, in part due to the unanticipated development of lower cost substitutes for CFCs. 44 In another study, researchers at Resources for the Future compared the ex ante cost predictions made by agencies in twenty-five rulemakings with ex post findings made by independent experts. 45 In nearly half the cases costs were overestimated ex ante, while in a quarter they were underestimated. 46 The ex ante estimates were deemed "accurate" -by being, ex post, within the estimated range or within a range of no more than 25 percent above or below any point estimates -in only a quarter of the cases. 47 On the basis of findings such as these, some researchers have suggested that economic analyses may tend to exhibit "some upward bias of ex ante cost estimates relative to actual because neither firms nor regulators can predict accurately the costsaving innovations that will likely occur once a real effort is make to comply with the rules."
48 Of course, it is also possible that agencies underestimate the costs, as well as over-or underestimate the benefits, of new regulations. 49 Even assuming that economic analyses conducted by agencies were always thorough and accurate, it would remain to determine whether they had an impact on the types of decisions made by regulatory agencies. Based on the government's own numbers, it would seem that agencies have not followed the results of their analyses. After all, most of the research purporting to show the inefficiency of existing regulation has been based on the very economic analyses that agencies have been required to produce. 50 Among those rules for which agencies monetized regulatory impacts (which is only a fraction of all rules), about a quarter of them fail a benefit-cost test. 51 More than forty-percent of all environmental regulations with monetized impacts reportedly fail to yield positive net benefits. 52 Perhaps the most pessimistic interpretation of these findings might be that economic analysis has had its greatest impact in documenting the inefficiency of government regulation, not in reducing it. 53 The mere fact that inefficient regulations continue to be issued, however, does not necessarily mean that economic analysis requirements have had no impact on regulatory decision making. The appropriate empirical test is whether decisions made under a requirement for economic analysis turn out to be less inefficient overall than decisions made without such a requirement. Some researchers have suggested that, at the very least, the regime for economic review has resulted in eliminating or preventing 44 Id. 56 Yet Morgenstern also acknowledges that it is not clear whether these improvements came about "solely because of the economic analysis….[nor whether] the same or similar changes might not have occurred for other reasons." 57 Researchers have yet to identify a clear counterfactual to use in assessing the extent to which these requirements affect regulatory outcomes. Since relatively few economic analyses were produced (and still fewer were required) prior to 1981 when Reagan's executive order was issued, it is difficult to compare regulatory outcomes before and after the imposition of economic analysis requirements. Yet the impact of analytical requirements can only be assessed with confidence by comparing regulatory decisions made under a regime of analytical requirements with decisions about similar issues made in the absence of such a requirement. One possible avenue for future empirical research would therefore be to compare regulations on similar issues across states with different requirements for analysis.
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Another avenue for future research might be to study more systematically why economic analysis requirements have apparently not had more of an impact on agency decision making. A variety of possible explanations have been offered, some of which may apply more to different agencies or with respect to different rulemakings. Agency officials, like others, may simply be boundedly rational, with a tendency to "satisfice" by not quantifying impacts or otherwise producing thorough analysis even when required to 54 Viscusi, supra note 29, at 1436 (noting that "OMB has succeeded in eliminating only extremely ineffective regulations"); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998) (arguing that agencies never adopted some of their least cost-effective proposals). 55 HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 51, at 52 (finding that "OIRA review does not significantly affect cost-effectiveness estimates"); Scott Farrow, Improving Regulatory Performance: Does Executive Office Oversight Matter? (unpublished manuscript, July 26, 2000) (indicating that overall "Executive Office review does not seem to improve (reduce) the cost-per-life-saved of regulation" do so. 59 Alternatively, agency officials may be ideologically resistant to the quantification or monetization of different kinds of social benefits and costs. 60 Even if they are willing to quantify costs and benefits, agency officials may sometimes seek to promote other values that are not easily captured by economic analysis. 61 They may respond, due to interest group pressures or other factors, to the distributional effects of policies (that is, to how the costs and benefits are distributed) more than to the aggregate net social benefits which have typically been the focus of economic analyses. Finally, they may simply be constrained by statutes that preclude the agency from considering benefit-cost analysis in setting regulatory standards. 62 The effectiveness of any new or modified economic analysis requirements will vary depending on which of these explanations accounts for inefficient regulation. If agency officials are constrained by statutes or are ideologically resistant to benefit-cost analysis, then requiring its use may not do much to make agency decisions more efficient. On the other hand, if agencies tend not to perform sound analyses because they tend simply to satisfice, regulatory requirements might prove to be more effective if they are accompanied by adequate incentives for agencies to undertake and rely upon serious, careful review. Recent proposals have emphasized strengthening OMB review of agency analysis and even providing opportunities for judicial review of an agency's economic analysis. 63 Of course, these proposals, if enacted, will merit their own empirical evaluation as well.
The broader point is that to develop institutional strategies to reduce the inefficiencies in government regulation, it will be beneficial to understand better why they arise. The available empirical research indicates that simply mandating analysis does not eliminate inefficiency, and it may not even significantly reduce it. This is not to suggest that economic analysis requirements have had no important effects or should be abandoned. It is instead to say that these effects have been neither as straightforward nor substantial as those who imposed these requirements probably hoped they would be. To achieve greater regulatory coherence and efficiency, decision makers will require further empirical research on the regulatory process itself, as they will need to know whether and how to strengthen existing requirements, improve the quality of regulatory analyses, and realign incentives so that agencies will act to achieve greater net benefits for society. Although compliance with economic analysis requirements is not currently enforceable through judicial review, 64 the courts do have the authority to enforce nearly all other legal requirements imposed on agencies. Much administrative law scholarship is based on the premise that judicial review of administrative action, if employed properly, can improve governance. 65 An analysis of what should be the proper role and standards for judicial review therefore depends on empirical claims about the effects courts have on the behavior of administrative agencies. 66 These effects may include making agencies more observant of legislative mandates, increasing the analytic quality of agency decision making, and promoting agency responsiveness to a wide range of interests. 67 Administrators who know that their actions may be subjected to judicial review may exercise greater overall care, making better, fairer, and more responsive decisions than administrators who are insulated from judicial oversight.
III. Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking
Notwithstanding these potential benefits, legal scholars have increasingly emphasized courts' potentially debilitating effects on agency rulemaking. In the early 1970s, rulemaking was considered to be, in Kenneth Culp Davis's terms, "one of the greatest inventions of modern government." 68 Yet it is now widely accepted that the rulemaking process has become "ossified," as agencies are thought to take years to issue new regulations and in some cases have allegedly retreated altogether from issuing new rules. 69 Legal scholars agree that one of the principal reasons administrative rulemaking has become ossified is the threat of judicial review. Government agencies are thought to face a high probability that their actions will be subject to litigation. 70 This threat of judicial review, combined with the uncertainty over what a reviewing court will find to be "arbitrary and capricious," has been viewed as creating significant delays for agencies seeking to develop regulations. 71 The looming possibility of judicial review, Thomas McGarity has argued, means that "agencies are constantly 'looking over their shoulders' 64 at the reviewing courts in preparing supporting documents, in writing preambles, in responding to public comments, and in assembling the rulemaking 'record. '" 72 In some cases, agencies have allegedly retreated altogether from efforts to establish new regulations. The U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is often viewed as the poster child of ossification. A prominent study by Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst is premised on the claim that NHTSA has shifted away from developing new auto safety standards in order to avoid judicial reversal. 73 Mashaw and Harfst claim that "devastating" losses in rulemaking litigation in the early 1970s led NHTSA to retreat from rulemaking. 74 They claim that most of NHTSA's safety standards were put into place before 1974 and none were issued since 1976. 75 They also argue that, instead of issuing new rules, NHTSA shifted its efforts toward increasing the number of recalls of defective vehicles, an approach which they argue leaves NHTSA less susceptible to judicial reversal. 76 Administrative law scholars appear almost universally to accept that pre-enforcement judicial review of regulations at NHTSA, as well as at other agencies, has led to a decline in new regulations.
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The view that judicial review has ossified the rulemaking process has important implications for regulatory reform debates. Judicial review has not only been both advocated as a means of promoting compliance with economic analysis requirements, it has also been opposed because of concerns about the paralysis of the regulatory process.
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What is needed is empirical evidence to inform decision making about whether to expand or contract opportunities for judicial review. Yet administrative law scholars have failed generally to produce systematic empirical analysis of the effects of judicial review.
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Empirical analysis can help to determine the extent to which administrative rulemaking has declined as well as how heightened judicial review may have affected the level of rulemaking output by agencies. The empirical evidence for a retreat from rulemaking in the face of stringent judicial review is not nearly as clear as has been generally supposed. As Figure 1 shows, the number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) has grown consistently over the years, even in the face of the courts' hard look review in the 1970s. Moreover, the volume of regulations issued by specific agencies has experienced a similar growth. From 1976-1996, the overall volume of regulations in the CFR slightly less than doubled.
80 NHTSA, the agency that has been widely perceived to have abandoned rulemaking, saw a slightly more than doubling of its CFR pages during the same period (a period subsequent to the early judicial defeats that purportedly sent NHTSA into rulemaking retreat). 81 It seems clear that regulatory agencies have not abandoned their use of rulemaking.
The impact of rulemaking has also grown, as indicated by the costs that regulations impose on the economy. In 1976, the CFR spanned 72,740 pages. By 1996, it had grown to 132,112 pages (or 1.8 times more pages). billion in 1992. 82 Even though NHTSA has been thought to have retreated from rulemaking since the mid-1970s, the agency continues to impose significant regulatory costs on the automobile industry. Prior to NHTSA's judicial defeats in 1972, complying with the agency's safety standards added no more than $200 to the cost of the average car, but by 1984 the agency's safety regulations had imposed costs of nearly $900 per car. 83 These costs appear only to have risen further since the 1980s.
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Available data on the volume and costs of regulation do not appear to support the prevailing view that agencies have retreated from rulemaking. However, these data may not seem quite as surprising in light of recent empirical research on the frequency of judicial reversals of agency rulemaking. While many observers have previously thought that judicial review is virtually assured for most agencies following an issuance of a new rule, the probability of judicial scrutiny is something that can be empirically determined. 85 It turns out, when the data are collected, that only a fraction of agency rules are ever subject to petitions for review. 86 Moreover, only a fraction of the challenges reach a judicial panel for decision; only a fraction of judicial decisions result in rules being remanded to the agency; and only a fraction of remands actually result in blocking the agency's decision.
For example, even though it is widely believed that most EPA rules, or at least most significant EPA rules, are challenged in court, 87 data reveal that the actual rate is about 26% and that even the most significant rules are subjected to petitions for review only about 35% the time. 88 After petitions for review are filed challenging EPA rules, only about 29% of them ever result in a decision of an appellate panel.
89 Settlement, it turns out, is a common means of disposing of judicial review litigation. 90 Moreover, in those cases that result in judges' decisions on the merits, in at least half of the cases the agency decision is upheld agency entirely. 91 Since 1981, about 300 reported judicial decisions based on the arbitrary and capricious standard have appeared reviewing the actions of five federal regulatory agencies combined (NHTSA, EPA, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Food and Drug Administration, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission). Yet over this same period, these five agencies have together promulgated more than 15,000 new regulations. The number of judicial decisions (not all of which involved reversals) therefore represents only about 2% of the overall output of these regulatory agencies.
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For an extensive list of sources claiming that litigants challenge 80 percent of the rules that EPA issues, see Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 24, at Appendix D.
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Id. at 1298-1300 (reporting data on the incidence of litigation filed against EPA's significant rules under the Clean Air Act and RCRA).
agency by a court, in only about 14% of the cases does the remand appear to present a serious obstacle to the agency in achieving its original objectives.
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Some of these data come from different samples, so care is needed in extrapolating across the different studies. Nevertheless, it is illustrative to note that when these data are combined it appears that judicial review blocks the EPA from taking action in only about 0.5% of all its rulemakings. Rather than indicating that judicial review has devastating impacts on agencies, these data appear instead to support Martin Shapiro's observation that "the courts generally let the agencies do what they want." 93 Of course, this does not mean that there are never any important legal decisions reversing agency decisions, just that as a percentage of rulemakings such obstructive judicial decisions are quite a rare occurrence. 94 The fact that judicial review occurs much less frequently than thought also does not necessarily mean that judicial review has had no effects on agency behavior. Perhaps in some subset of the most significant rulemaking judicial review does makes agencies more careful, hesitant, or both. It is possible that agencies have prevailed so often because they refrain from taking action that would expose them to litigation risks. 95 This, of course, would generally be consistent with the ossification hypothesis, which supposes that agencies have to work harder to produce rules that will withstand judicial scrutiny. Yet if a rulemaking retreat is truly occurring, which several case study authors have claimed, this retreat is not reflected in the growth in CFR pages and the increasing costs associated with environmental and safety regulations. The growth in regulations and regulatory costs would appear to be more consistent with the evidence that shows that the probability of judicial reversal is quite low.
Admittedly, there are challenges in assessing the impact of judicial review or any other purportedly "ossifying" requirement on federal agencies. Since such requirements tend to apply across all federal agencies, it is often difficult to find appropriate crosssectional comparisons between different agencies. Analysis of agency rulemaking over time may be complicated if changes in judicial doctrines or other regulatory oversight procedures have occurred at about the same time as have changes in other plausible factors affecting rulemaking, such as the party affiliation of the executive branch.
In a recent study, Stuart Shapiro sought to overcome these challenges by examining the ossification of rulemaking at the state level. To ensure variation across states, he chose to study day care regulation, an area that has remained largely 
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These data appear generally consistent with the general deference courts give to agencies. Peter Schuck and Donald Elliott's study of published appellate decisions found a high level of judicial affirmances of agency decisions of all types. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 79, at 1011 (noting that "in administrative law … the agency wins almost 90% of the time").
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Id. at 1010-11. unencumbered by preemptive federal regulatory standards. 96 Relying on a series of carefully selected matched case studies, Shapiro found that day care regulators in states with seemingly cumbersome rulemaking procedures were generally not deterred from issuing new regulations. Even though positive political theory would suggest that enacting coalitions control agencies by adopting procedures for rulemaking review, 97 Shapiro found that the key determinant of regulatory activity in the states was the existing political climate. When the existing coalition was supportive of regulatory change, change tended to occur, notwithstanding the presence of procedural hurdles put in place by earlier coalitions.
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Recent and emerging empirical research on both rulemaking trends and the frequency of judicial review raises questions about the extent to which judicial review has ossified the regulatory process. As these empirical findings run counter to the prevailing understanding among administrative law scholars, it should be clear that empirical analysis has become highly relevant to central issues in administrative law. Additional empirical research would help illuminate these issues and provide still further avenues for assessing claims that judicial review hampers agency rulemaking.
IV. Negotiation as Regulatory Reform
Although the effects of judicial review merit further empirical inquiry, many administrative law scholars and policy makers have advocated agency efforts designed to stave off the filing of litigation in the first place.
99 Specifically, they have encouraged agencies to employ formal negotiation with affected interests over the terms of new regulations in an effort to avoid litigation and speed up the rulemaking process.
Negotiated rulemaking is a procedure by which government regulations are negotiated by representatives from government, regulated firms, trade associations, citizen groups, and other affected organizations prior to the agency's decision to issue a proposal for a new regulation. 100 A negotiated rulemaking committee comprising the 96 Shapiro, Speed Bumps and Roadblocks, supra note 58. 97 See supra note 16. 98 Shapiro, Speed Bumps and Roadblocks, supra note 58. 
